Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Science of Knowing (Wissenschaftslehre) [1st ed]', 'Interview with Baggini and Stangroom' and 'The Structure of Objects'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


45 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
Humour can give a phenomenological account of existence, and point to change [Critchley]
Humour is practically enacted philosophy [Critchley]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Scientism is the view that everything can be explained causally through scientific method [Critchley]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
German idealism aimed to find a unifying principle for Kant's various dualisms [Critchley]
Since Hegel, continental philosophy has been linked with social and historical enquiry. [Critchley]
Continental philosophy fights the threatened nihilism in the critique of reason [Critchley]
Continental philosophy is based on critique, praxis and emancipation [Critchley]
Continental philosophy has a bad tendency to offer 'one big thing' to explain everything [Critchley]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology
Phenomenology is a technique of redescription which clarifies our social world [Critchley]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Fichte's subjectivity struggles to then give any account of objectivity [Pinkard on Fichte]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
The 'aggregative' objections says mereology gets existence and location of objects wrong [Koslicki]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Consequence is truth-preserving, either despite substitutions, or in all interpretations [Koslicki]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
'Roses are red; therefore, roses are colored' seems truth-preserving, but not valid in a system [Koslicki]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
Normativity needs the possibility of negation, in affirmation and denial [Fichte, by Pinkard]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
Some questions concern mathematical entities, rather than whole structures [Koslicki]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 3. Structural Relations
Structures have positions, constituent types and number, and some invariable parts [Koslicki]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
'Categorical' properties exist in the actual world, and 'hypothetical' properties in other worlds [Koslicki]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
I aim to put the notion of structure or form back into the concepts of part, whole and object [Koslicki]
If a whole is just a structure, a dinner party wouldn't need the guests to turn up [Koslicki]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
The clay is just a part of the statue (its matter); the rest consists of its form or structure [Koslicki]
Statue and clay differ in modal and temporal properties, and in constitution [Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / c. Form as causal
Structure or form are right at the centre of modern rigorous modes of enquiry [Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
There are at least six versions of constitution being identity [Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
For three-dimensionalist parthood must be a three-place relation, including times [Koslicki]
The parts may be the same type as the whole, like a building made of buildings [Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Wholes in modern mereology are intended to replace sets, so they closely resemble them [Koslicki]
Wholes are entities distinct from their parts, and have different properties [Koslicki]
Wholes are not just their parts; a whole is an entity distinct from the proper parts [Koslicki]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
Necessary truths derive from basic assertion and negation [Fichte, by Pinkard]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Fichte's logic is much too narrow, and doesn't deduce ethics, art, society or life [Schlegel,F on Fichte]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
Fichte's key claim was that the subjective-objective distinction must itself be subjective [Fichte, by Pinkard]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / a. Other minds
We only see ourselves as self-conscious and rational in relation to other rationalities [Fichte]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
The Self is the spontaneity, self-relatedness and unity needed for knowledge [Fichte, by Siep]
Novalis sought a much wider concept of the ego than Fichte's proposal [Novalis on Fichte]
The self is not a 'thing', but what emerges from an assertion of normativity [Fichte, by Pinkard]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
Consciousness of an object always entails awareness of the self [Fichte]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
Judgement is distinguishing concepts, and seeing their relations [Fichte, by Siep]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
Fichte's idea of spontaneity implied that nothing counts unless we give it status [Fichte, by Pinkard]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
Perceiving meaninglessness is an achievement, which can transform daily life [Critchley]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Fichte reduces nature to a lifeless immobility [Schlegel,F on Fichte]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
The Kripke/Putnam approach to natural kind terms seems to give them excessive stability [Koslicki]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
Natural kinds support inductive inferences, from previous samples to the next one [Koslicki]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
Concepts for species are either intrinsic structure, or relations like breeding or ancestry [Koslicki]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
Should vernacular classifications ever be counted as natural kind terms? [Koslicki]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
There are apparently no scientific laws concerning biological species [Koslicki]